Let's see how we might move from a simpler to a more realistic game model in a real-world example of strategic thinking: in a teacher class relationship in shaping the near future of their teaching - learning.
For this example, the players will be a teacher of English considering some changes, i. e. training further training re-training towards a higher efficiency, and a group of students who are also considering some changes, i. e. learning more efficient learning methods.

The two choices are to use

• a philosophically - pedagogically - psychologically - sociologically more advanced system with more functionality and more joy, or
• a more proven system with less functionality and less joy in the teaching - learning.

We'll assume that the more advanced system really does supply a lot more functionality and joy, so that the payoffs to the two players, expressed in a relative level of functionality and joy, are as shown below. 

 We see that both players can be better off if an advanced system is installed. To be more specific, this vatiation really means that

• The teacher wants to train up, i. e. to learn how to teach differently and teach her class how to learn differently, and based on that wants to apply a philosophically - pedagogically - psychologically - sociologically more advanced system with more functionality and more joy for all concerned, and the class want exactly the same.

Here, everybody wants what they get, and everybody gets what they want. Here, the teacher serves the long-term needs of the class. Even in the Proven,Proven (low,low) variation everybody seems to be satisfied. More specifically,

• The teacher wants to stick to a more proven system, even if it is with less functionality and less joy in the teaching learning for all concerned, and her class want exactly the same.

Here, again, everybody wants what they get, and everybody gets what they want, at a lower level than in the Advanced,Advanced (high,high) variation. Here, the teacher serves the short-term wants of the class. But the worst that can happen is for one player to commit to an advance system while the other player stays with the proven one. In that case there is no payoffs for anyone. In the worst cases none of the players get what they want and they do not want what they get. To be more specific, the variations are as follows:

• In Variation #1 the teacher wants to train up, i. e. to learn how to teach differently and teach her class how to learn differently, and based on that wants to apply a philosophically - pedagogically - psychologically - sociologically more advanced system with more functionality and more joy for all concerned, but the class want to stick to a more proven system even if it is with less functionality and less joy in the teaching learning for all concerned.
• In variation # 2 the class want their teacher to train up, i. e. to learn how to teach differently and teach them how to learn differently, and want her to apply a philosophically - pedagogically - psychologically - sociologically more advanced system with more functionality and more joy for all concerned, but the teacher wants to stick to a more proven system even if it is with less functionality and less joy in the teaching learning for all concerned.

The problem there is that the teacher and the class must have a compatible standard, in order to work together, and since the choice of a standard is a strategic choice, their strategies have to mesh. The optimal strategy for each participant depends on the strategy chosen by the other participant. In the example, if the class opts for the advanced system, then it is best for the teacher to do that too, or else the class needs a teacher who does that too. But, hold on here! If the class chooses the proven system, it's best for the teacher to do that too, or else the class needs a teacher who does that too. It may seem easy enough to opt for the advanced system which is better all around, but if each participant believes that the other will stick with the proven system, then it will be best for each player to choose the proven system -- and each will be right in assuming that the other one is a stick in the mud! This is a danger typical of a class of games called coordination games, and what we have learned is that the choice of compatible standards is a coordination game. We have assumed that the payoffs are known and certain. In the real world, every strategic decision is risky and a decision for the advanced system is likely to be riskier than a decision for the proven system. Thats the reason why most teachers opt for the latter.. Thus, we would have to take into account the players' subjective attitudes toward risk, their risk aversion, to make the example fully realistic. The example assumes that payoffs are more felt than measured. Thus, we are not only leaving risk aversion out of the picture, but also any other subjective rewards and penalties that cannot be measured. Real choices of teaching learning systems are likely to involve more than two players, and in the long run the class may choose among several teacgers, and teachers may have many classes. That makes the coordination problem harder to solve. Suppose, for example, that teaching English through English to a self-directed peer-learning class is the advanced system, and teaching grammar - translation through the mother-tongue to a silently copying class is the proven system. Lets also suppose that in about 90% of the classes the proven system is used. Then the proven system may take over from the advanced even though the advanced is the better system. Many game theorists and others believe this is a main reason why certain technical or educational standards gain dominance. On the one hand, the optimal strategy for each participant depends on the strategy chosen by the other participant. On the other hand, the class and the teacher don't have to just sit back and wait to see what the other party does -- they can sit down and talk it out, and commit themselves to a contract. In fact, they have to do so, because the payoffs also has to be agreed upon.